October 20, 2011

The Lessons of Palestinian Aid

When Warren Buffett decided to give the vast majority of his fortune to charity, he made a surprising decision about how it could be used most effectively: he gave the vast majority of his wealth to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  Despite having his own foundation and many different choices of worthy causes, Buffett chose the Gates Foundation not only for its reputation for generosity, but also because of its strength in monitoring the charitable causes to make sure that they were getting the most ‘bang for the buck.’   His decision showed that, above all, Buffett wanted his money to be used to create as much good as possible, regardless of whether or not it enhanced his status. Perhaps there is a lesson in Buffett’s decision that could be learned by the United States Congress as it debates what to do about economic aid to the Palestinian Authority.  In making their decision, Congressmen must remember that the purpose of aid is to make a difference, not just to give the appearance of caring.

The debate has been brought to a head by the PA’s unilateral statehood bid, delivered by President Mahmoud Abbas to the United Nations Security Council during September’s UN Assembly.   The United States has long held the position that the only way a secure and lasting peace will be created is through bilateral negotiations with Israel.  Yet, despite the US’ concerns and many attempts to persuade the Palestinian leadership to do otherwise, the PA decided to go it alone, continuing the plan of promoting the international isolation of Israel (and simultaneously managing to make the USA look impotent).

Arguably the strongest card that the US played in its attempt to change the PA’s course of action was the threat to withdraw aid to the Palestinian territories.  The argument being made by many members of Congress is that if the Palestinians are really ready for statehood, as their proposal claims, then they have no continued need for American funding. (This warning was followed up by the US Senate’s vote in favour of Resolution 185 by a wide margin). But the reality, beyond the PA’s boasting, is that the withdrawal of aid would economically devastate the fragile and restricted Palestinian economy.

While the threat was one ostensibly meant to punish poor Palestinian leadership, the effect will be to punish the Palestinian people, which will at the same time increase the risk to Israel.  There is a definite link between economic hardship and the unrest of the Arab Spring (which is why socioeconomic models are the best for explaining the uprisings).  Further depression of the West Bank economy will only make the population more desperate and therefore more susceptible to extremist advances.  Furthermore, the weakening of Fatah could play into the hands of their political rivals, the terrorist group Hamas, who have recently revitalised their position on the Palestinian scene through securing the freedom of more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners for the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit after 5 years.

The danger of withdrawing assistance to the Palestinian territories does not change the fact that the funding is in desperate need of reform. The fact is that aid to the Palestinians has been a failure for years. Fatah has used its funding to help silence political opposition.  Aid given to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which is dedicated solely to helping Palestinian refugees, promotes the continued belief that the Palestinians will reclaim all of the original mandate at the expense of Israel, rather than working towards Palestinian integration.  Educational materials and television programming are developed which encourage hatred and mistrust of Israel to both the young and old.  Leaders, whose positions are enabled through relief funds, refuse to condemn violence.

The effects of such poorly directed aid have been obvious.  Gaza has radicalised, with hundreds of rockets being fired into Israeli territory every year. While the erection of the separation fence on the West Bank border has made it more difficult for would-be terrorists, attacks still continue and the danger is still a daily concern for many Israelis.  Furthermore, the aid has done nothing to advance peace negotiations, which have made very little concrete progress since the untimely death of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

Yet there is an alternative to both the immediate danger of the full withdrawal of aid or the long-term negative effects of poorly distributed funds, which is through careful monitoring and case-by-case redistribution. Funds can be withdrawn from hate-mongering politicians and given to others who do condemn violence, all whilst still being delivered to those who are building critical infrastructure.  If the PA refuses to develop appropriate educational material, the money could be instead  put into the development of alternative educational material in association with Arab Israeli communities, who are in a unique position to be able to relate to Palestinian people. This process could be investigated for every area in which foreign aid is spent.  While there will always be some cases where aid will be misspent, more intensive monitoring and redistribution could quickly become much more effective in building a strong, viable and peaceful Palestine, one which would be a real partner for peace with Israel.

The reality is that the giving or withdrawing of aid, in and of itself, may score political points but it holds no guarantee of successful outcomes.  To ensure the long-term interests of both itself and its ally Israel, the US must take a lesson from Warren Buffett: take a strong step  to ensure that their money is being used in the best way possible.

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September 26, 2011

Is Palestinian Recognition of a Jewish State a Legitimate Demand?

The speeches now completed, some clarity has come with the calm following the first wave of the storm over Palestinian statehood at the United Nations.  Many things have been revealed, although none of them are particularly startling.  First, this is not going to be a simple matter, with the question of who will support whom and what impact it will have on international relations set to continue to be fought behind closed doors and through difficult discussions for at least weeks, if not months, to come.  Secondly, whatever occurs, there will not be a new self-governed state of Palestine as the result of a vote in the Security Council–which is the only body with the power to grant such a move.  Lastly, this means that for any concrete developments towards peace, all parties must look at the return to negotiations, heading the call being made by the Middle East Quartet and other major international players before, during and after the statehood bid.

As Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and others spread the call for a return to negotiations, it is worth considering what the prospects are for success in a new round of talks.  If there is no chance for success, then the talks, like the UN statehood bid, could also be a waste of time that leaves everyone looking as bad, or possibly worse, than before.  While the 18 years of failure following the Oslo Accords already makes success seem like a long-shot, the most important consideration is how the discussions were left (or perhaps more accurately, why they fell apart) a little less than a year ago.

It was September 2010 and a 10-month moratorium on Israeli settlement building in the West Bank was coming to an end.  This moratorium had been unilaterally offered by Israel to the Palestinian Authority (at the behest of President Obama) as an olive branch to restart peace talks.  This move, while much applauded, is generally considered to be a failure, as the Palestinian Authority had refused to return to the table until 9 months in, when it became likely that the settlement freeze was going to expire.  Having conceded nothing so far, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas demanded that Israel extend the freeze or else the Palestinians would withdraw from the thus-far non-existent negotiations.

Netanyahu came up with an alternative idea.  He offered to extend the moratorium, but only on the condition that the Palestinian Authority recognised Israel as a “Jewish state.”  Abbas refused, and both parties went home happy, each being able to blame the other for the latest setback in the advancement of peace.  Abbas blamed Netanyahu for allowing the settlement freeze to expire and for bringing in a seemingly irrelevant matter into peace talks; Netanyahu blamed Abbas for not being serious about negotiations by refusing to make any concessions towards the Israeli side.

But who, if either of them, was right?  Was Netanyahu’s demand that the PA recognise Israel as a Jewish state just a cynical ploy to abrogate the discussions and continue the status quo?  On the surface, Israel’s demand seems irrelevant, as how a state defines itself surely is an internal matter.  It shouldn’t really matter whether or not the Palestinians (or any other group) recognizes the Jewish character of the state if Israel, just that they recognise and respect the state itself.   The demand was also putting Abbas in a precarious position, as he wants to be seen as defending the right of return of the Palestinian refugees and the symbolic link to the Arab Israelis, ethnic Palestinians, who are non-Jewish citizens of Israel.

Yet, there is a deeper meaning to the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Such a statement recognises two realities: first, that there is a meaningful connection between the Jewish religion and the State of Israel. Second, that Israel has the right to define itself as a Jewish, a Christian, a secular or even a Jedi state if it so chooses. The true significance of the demand was whether the Palestinian Authority would respect the fact that Israel has a legitimate claim to its own state. If Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are actually willing to make the meaningful concessions that would lead to possible success in negotiations, it must begin with the recognition of the right of Israel to exist. It would be possible to do so without completely losing face, for it would surely be enough for Abbas just to say that Israel can define itself however it chooses. The fact that he was not willing to do so indicates that the current Palestinian leadership is at bare minimum unwilling to make the necessary concessions for peace, but more worryingly, may still be promoting the future state of Palestine to exist in place of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Comments from Abbas’ recent United Nations speech reinforced this underlying concern that the PA is not currently willing to accept a peaceful solution for a Palestinian State alongside the State of Israel. First, he spoke at the UN of Palestine being occupied for 63 year, i.e., since 1948. This marks the UN partition plan that split the former British mandate of Palestine into two states, one with a majority Jewish population and one with a majority Arab population based on the people who were already living there. This contrasts markedly from the proposal being submitted for statehood at the UN, which calls for borders on or negotiated from before the war in 1967. If the Palestinians are plan for gaining statehood is still to hold a claim on Israeli land, it means there will be no permanent solution coming from any negotiations or creation of a Palestinian state, so Israel will be rightly wary about its security. If there was any way to doubt this conclusion, it was undone by his mentioning of Palestine being he land of the Prophet Muhammed and Jesus Christ, but conspicuously absent was any reference to Jews or even religious figures who have shared heritage between Judaism and Islam, such as Abraham.

There may be many reasons why Abbas has chosen to take such a hard stance. It was obvious that his speech was aimed at his local and regional audience; the threat of Hamas and other rivals for the always precarious Palestinian leadership will lead him to take a hard line against Israel. However, it also says something about the general Palestinian beliefs about the future; that the vast majority of them believe that, at some point, they will retake all of what they believe is originally Palestinian lands. If not, Abbas would not have the need to take such a hard line. This was reinforced by recent interview with Mohammed Rachid, one of Yassir Arafat’s former aides, who criticised the Palestinian leadership. In the article it is claimed that Abbas and other Palestinian leaders “nurtur[ed] false hopes among Palestinian refugees and their descendants through the years over their “right of return” to historic Palestine (now Israel), knowing it was incompatible with any potential peace agreement.” This has created a situation where agreements necessary for peace would be political suicide for the Palestinian leadership. For peace to occur, it will take Palestinian leadership strong enough to tell its people the hard truth about the right of Israel to exist. Abbas, sadly, does not appear to be up to the challenge.

So was it really cynical for Bibi Netanyahu to pull the Jewish State card at the negotiations?  Even knowing that it would probably spell the death of the last round of negotiations does not make it an illegitimate point.  The fact is, the only reason such a demand would end the negotiations is if the Palestinian leadership was either unwilling or unable to compromise to the point where they would accept a State of Israel living peacefully alongside a State of Palestine. This means that the recognition of Israel’s character and its rights is more than just a legitimate demand; it is a necessary precursor to any successful peace negotiations. For until the time comes that the Palestinians and the Arab world as a whole are prepared to accept the existence of a Jewish state, it is hard to see what negotiations will solve.

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September 21, 2011

What is the Bid Going to be, Abbas?

The text  for the Palestinian Authority’s United Nations Statehood Bid to the Security Council has not yet been published.  The General Assembly has opened, speeches are being made for and against, yet the bid still remains a secret. Surely to gain the most support for a proposal, you must convince the other countries of your ideas; with the important initial step being actually informing them of what it is.  Yet, as the silence remains with less than two days before Mahmoud Abbas is due to make his case in a speech on Friday, surely it raises the question of why?

The simple answer may be that Abbas has not yet decided how to phrase the Palestinian bid.  Perhaps this is not so surpising, as there seems to be two very different ways for the bid to be worded, both of which could have a massive impact on the amount of support it receives.  And unfortunately for Abbas, there is inherent difficulty in either version of the bid.

Version 1: The statehood bid asks for a Palestinian state to be declared with exact borders (either directly on the pre-1967 borders or on unilaterally determined borders along similar lines).  This would be the stronger approach by the Palestinian Authority, because it asks for the whole nine yards without giving up anything in return.  Of course, by asking so much the proposal comes across as more extreme– not giving any recognition for legitimate Israeli concerns, such as security. It makes the Palestinian Authority stand in direct violation of the Oslo Accords, which determines their legitimacy to rule over the Palestinian territories. Furthermore, this type of bid will serve to alienate many of the countries that are still undecided about the Palestinian bid, including especially many European countries, leaving the PA to face the possibilty of being rejected in the Security Council without the USA even needing to exercise its veto.

Version 2: The statehood bid asks for recognition of a Palestinian state with full borders and other pertaining issues to be determined in the future.  Most likely, this approach would say something “Recognise the state of Palestine now so that we can determine borders based on the 1967 lines through negotiations.”  This proposal would attempt to force President Obama’s hand into accepting the bid because it takes the language Obama himself used when making his foreign policy speech in May. It also has the added benefit of giving the impression that the Palestinians recognise Israel’s needs, because they are willing to negotiate to reach a final settlement.

But the weaking of the statement of Version 2 leads to its own problems.  By its very nature an incomplete proposal, it will be hard for Abbas to convince the world that the Palestinians have made a full and compelling case.  Also, more countries than Israel will worry about accepting a Palestinian state on uncertain borders, notably Jordan, which was the actual country that held the West Bank border before 1967.  But, perhaps more importantly, it is massively undermining for Abbas himself.  If he is calling for negotiations, then why does the PA continue to refuse to return to the negotiation table despite the encouragement of the Middle East Quartet and Israel?  If negotiations are what they want, then why ignore Obama and Sarkozy’s calls for renewed discussions, even today? (Side note: I do recognise the significance of settlement building as a barrier to peace.  Not only had the Palestinian Authority negotiated for many years before the implementation of settlement freezes, but also had already walked away from the table before the latest settlement freeze expired less than a year ago.  Obviously, settlement building is not the overriding factor in the PA’s decision making.)

It is a tough call for Abbas to make.  Neither are good choices and it is too late to turn back now.  While the Palestinians have been waiting a long time for their chance in the United Nations, it seems right now that Friday–and Abbas’ speech–may be coming a bit too soon.

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August 20, 2011

Terror Attacks and the Lack of Human Decency

My initial reaction to the terror attacks beginning Thursday in Israel was one of horror; the feeling that I would expect any human to have upon hearing a story about the murder of innocent people.  In the search to learn more about what actually was happening  in Israel I also discovered a lot about the variety of human compassion or lack thereof; while it is true that tragedy can bring out the very best in some people, it is also true that it can bring out the very worst in others.

Shock, horror and concern was emanating from many of the sources I read in Israel, which were relating their sorrow and their sympathy.  Many people were looking for ways that they could help, or trying to relay information as fast as possible to help increase the understanding of what had occurred.  Many of the responses, not only throughout Israel but also of concerned people throughout the world were incredibly positive, putting the circumstances of others before their own needs.  Politicians in America immediately condemned the terror attacks.  Campaigners in Israel decided to postpone this weekend’s events for the ongoing social protests over inflated house and cost of living in deference to the victims and their families.

While all of this showed the best side of people, the dark side of humanity had begun to leak out as well.  The official responses from Palestinian political organisations were unsurprising unsympathetic. Ahmed Yousef, a senior official for Hamas, explained, “I don’t think Hamas is behind these attacks, but we praise them since they were against soldiers.” Of course, this statement was factually incorrect, as of the three attacks that had occurred by that time, only one was against a military patrol, while a civilian bus and car had both been fired upon (and had the most casualties). But more importantly, this statement contained nothing but praise for the attacks, completely ignoring the plight of the civilians who were mercilessly targeted.  Glaringly absent was the condemnation of attacks against the innocent.

The Palestinian Authority‘s statement, while less forward with outright praise for the violence, still left much to be desired.  Saeb Ereket, the Palestinian Authority’s chief negotiator, responded initially with a warning against Israel, saying that “Israel stands warned of any possible aggressive action or collective punishment measures against the Palestinian population in Gaza.” He did eventually go on to say that the Palestinian Authority was “against violence in all its forms,” without ever expressing sympathy for the victims.  But without a strong condemnation, it is hard to read the statement as anything but an attempt at framing Palestinians as a victim of the impending Israeli response to the murder of its citizens.

While it was disappointing to again see no true stand against terrorism in the Palestinian leadership, these statements were hardly surprising, as this is consistent with their responses to previous attacks.  Where I was truly taken aback was the responses coming out of either groups or individuals who claimed to be advocates of Palestinian rights.  Perhaps naively, I hoped that there would be general condemnation and genuine expressions of sympathy, such as the kind that came out of far-right groups in Europe when Anders Behring Breivek committed his massacre in Norway.  While it was only possible for me to read a representative sample, within it there was no condemnation or frustration with terrorist attacks or use of violence.  Instead, there were two general responses:

The first and undoubtedly biggest concern of most of the pro-Palestinian advocates was about how to protect Gaza from reprisals from Israel.  It cannot be denied that collective punishment is a legitimate fear, as there can be no justification for punishment of the innocent (in the same way that there is no justification for terrorism).  But what was notably absent was any consideration over whether there were culpable individuals in Gaza who deserved to face justice.  This fundamentally misplaces the responsibility both for the the actions, which intelligence indicates were the work of a terrorist cell based in Gaza, and for the response, since the plain-clothes terrorists choose to hide amongst civilians to deter attacks and, consequently, endanger their own people. The responsibility, in this case, falls on the terrorists and on the governments that harbour them.  The world should expect and ought to approve of Israel’s choice to respond against terrorists. After all, the general approval of the death of Osama bin Laden showed that most people are receptive and sympathetic to retaliatory justice, especially if located in a country is unable or unwilling to stop the terrorists (the notable exception to this being Hamas, which condemned the killing of bin Laden.)

Yet if the general response was concern, albeit strangely for the future possible victims of injustice rather than for the immediate victims of terror, the second category of the responses were much more horrific. Beyond many attempts to justify the terrorist attacks, there was also praise and celebration.  Probably the most disgusting message that I came across was on Twitter from a person in California, who exclaimed “What a good morning! 6 israelis were killed in an attack in Eilat!”  This was from a person who claimed to be a human rights activist, particularly concerned with fighting racism and injustice–claims that could only possibly seem true through a Herculean stretch of the imagination. Of course, this is an extremist point of view that few would vocalise (and I did find one person from the pro-Palestinian camp–in America–who condemned this statement), but far more often were people willing to accept and tolerate this point of view.  The opportunity to condemn terrorism and violence was once again spurned, and not one called for Hamas or other militant groups to change their ways.

Sadly, this is a real obstacle for peace. Those leaders and groups who advocate for Palestinian rights seem to refuse to condemn the use of violence as a tool for protest and, in some cases, work to justify it.  Many of these same people try to claim a legacy from great activists such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Nelson Mandela, but seem to have missed the message. I await the day when voices of compassion and human decency have sway amongst the leaders of the pro-Palestinian movement; until then, they only empower those who use violence, which can destroy the lives of some people but helps the cause of no one.

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August 15, 2011

Middle East Turmoil is Not the Same Old Story

A long-standing, passionate pan-Arab concern for the Palestinian plight is being exposed in the turmoil throughout the Arab world, according to Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick in their recent NY Times article “In Tumult, New Hope for Palestinian Cause.” There is only one small problem with this analysis: the fact that it couldn’t have been more wrong. Many in the Arab world have finally broken through layers of repression to show us their biggest concerns and, as it turns out, the situation of their “Palestinian brothers”—oft-cited as the great barrier to peace in the Middle East—is only the least of them.

All around the Middle East, people have risen up to demand rights. The protesters in Tahrir Square were not holding signs saying “Free Palestine,” but rather, demanding jobs and government reform. Unsurprisingly in Egypt, just like everywhere else, no one is happy when their economy is floundering; especially true when they have no voice. It is these issues, rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict, that are the ones that have gotten so many protesters out onto the streets, the ones that are keeping them up at night.

The article asserts that since some public opinion surveys claim that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the key obstacle to peace in the Middle East, they must be right. Yet in this case, they are quite patently false when it comes to the underlying causes of regional turmoil. Rather, the surveys reveal that we have wasted far too much time on an issue that, in terms of other problems in the Middle East, is perhaps of relatively minor importance. This cursory understanding of the real issues that unsettle the Arab World in our foreign politics—such as the Iran-Saudi struggle for hegemony, the lack of economic opportunity and lack of rights across the region, especially for women—may explain why so little progress has been made towards peace during the last 30 years with America as the most influential foreign player in the region.

The stirring of anti-Semitism has been a very successful tactic by Middle Eastern tyrants and autocrats to deflect criticism from these key issues which could threaten their control. Throughout the Middle East, politicians and media outlets repeatedly blame unrest on the influence of Israel (and the West); though they do not always bother to differentiate between what is being done by “Israel” or what is done by “the Jews.” The notorious anti-Semitic forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, is a highly-promoted best-seller. Furthermore, these tactics are as blatantly obvious as they are horribly xenophobic. Yet, somehow, counter-intuitively and counter-factually, Shadid and Kirkpatrick claim that the revolts have served as a “rebuttal to the old bromide” that autocrats have inflamed anti-Semitism for their own purposes. In reality, the protests have done the very opposite, exposing these tactics for what they are. Furthermore, it has shown that millions across the Arab world are better than giving into this base hatred by pressuring their governments to solver the real problems they face such as a lack of human rights, rather than continuing to blaming Israel.

Yet the article proceeds to argue that the dictators were right all along, by saying that it really is the situation of those supposedly poor, helpless Palestinians, being perpetuated by “evil Israel”, as the underlying cause of unrest in the region. There seems to be little reason to support this naïve perspective, other than assuming that we somehow know better than the protesters, who risk life and limb in the face of oppressive governments. This presumption, based on the fact that the Palestinian issue continues to be high on the agenda of politicians, only shows that the people of Egypt are still be subjected to politics as usual. The military still rules the country, so the ever-successful strategy of using latent anti-Semitism through anti-Israel talk continues to be used to placate the public as reform stalls. While Shadid and Kirkpatrick seemingly acknowledge there are bigger issues behind the Arab Spring, they steadfastly refuses to grasp the bigger picture.

The most frustrating thing about this response is that the very people we trust in these situations are the reporters; the ones who are on the front lines, the ones who should see which way the wind is blowing and know what to expect. Yet the Arab Spring took a vast majority of Middle East correspondents by surprise—a cardinal sin in journalism—because they bought into the same line as well, that the Israeli-Arab conflict is the key problem in the region, rather than the lack of freedom and opportunity for so many under repressive governments throughout the Middle East.

But why have so many reporters willingly embraced this stance? It may be because it is far easier to report from the democratic state of Israel about the situation of the Palestinians than any other major issue in the Middle East; imagine how long a reporter would continue to be welcome in Saudi Arabia if they were constantly criticising the government for its lack of human rights? Probably about as long as foreign journalists were allowed in Syria when protests first spread to Hama and Damascus: they were on the first plane out.

Yet, tough as the change might be for reporters of the Middle East, the easy story doesn’t cut it any more. For example, it turns out that many of the so-called Palestinian protesters that the article alleges were “autonomous[ly]” assembling to protest Israel were, in fact, paid by the Syrian government to provide a distraction while Assad’s regime continued its brutal suppression of opposition, according to the Reform Party of Syria. Appearances can be deceiving and public opinion polls are just that; opinions rather than facts. A successful resolution to Palestinian issues will only way to reach a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this conflict is only a sideline to the power brokers in Middle Eastern politics. To continue to inflate the importance of the situation is not only lazy reporting, but also playing into the hands of the very people who are fighting against the democratic wave that is still sweeping through the Middle East.

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July 27, 2011

Are Palestinian Refugees Preventing Peace in the Middle East?

Individually, Palestinian refugees will have their own views, opinions and actions, some of which will be conducive to peace and others of which will not be.  This article cannot determine which of the Palestinians do and which do not want peace; instead, it examines the question of the Palestinian refugees as a whole and the question of what to do with them, as this remains one of the most intractable problems for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Any solution which is acceptable to the Arab countries would not work for Israel, and any solution which would work for Israel would not work for the Arab countries.  The Palestinian refugees themselves, as usual, get very little to say, but are continuously let down by their own leaders.

To understand why the refugee problem is so difficult, the scale of it must be known.  While there are many reasons to be uncertain about the numbers of Palestinian refugees, it is most commonly accepted that there were somewhere between 600,000-750,000 refugees following the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948.   Even more uncertain than the numbers then are the numbers now, because of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s Palestinian Refugee criteria:

These are persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. Palestine Refugees, and descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are eligible to register for UNRWA services. The Agency accepts new applications from persons who wish to be registered as Palestine Refugees.

There is some very peculiar language in this declaration.  First of all, there is no distinction between people who left of their own accord and those who were forced out.  This leaves a questionable status over the moral obligation towards a right of return to the area. But an even more pressing issue is over the fact that all descendents of Palestinian refugees are also considered refugees.  This has led the numbers of people considered to be refugees to swell to around 4.8 million people, spread between the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.

The problem of what to do with these refugees is very difficult. For most, is impossible to determine specific claims to an area or a home.  This is due to multiple reasons, such as lack of documents, inaccurate registers, and importantly, age (since the original people who left their homes more than 60 years ago).  This is before even attempting to address the issue of whether descendents should be owed anything and if so, what?  All of this makes it necessarily complex and debatable the best and most accurate way to implement UN General Resolution 194, which calls for refugees to return to their homes or receive compensation.  But even more importantly, from a political standpoint, is the  impact that these refugees would have on the areas that they could eventually inhabit. The reason this is so important is that it could determine whether or not governments are willing to agree to a solution that will finally end the Palestinian refugee problem.

Consider Israel, which currently has a population of just under 8 million. Of these, 75% (or 5.8 million) are Jewish and 20% (or 1.5 million) are ethnically Palestinian Arabs.  What this means is that if the 4.8 million new Palestinians were to enter Israel, they would become the automatic majority.  This would never be accepted by Israel for two reasons.  First, Israel would not accept a deal that would lead to a Jewish minority because of concerns that it would lose its policy of acting as a world refuge for the Jewish people, following the horror of the Holocaust. Furthermore, even if there were a possibility, it would be unlikely that Israelis would trust a government in which they were a minority, and for good reason.  Israel is the most free country in the Middle East by some distance; to allow its government to be dominated by forces from countries that have much worse records could be suicidal, especially with the (at best) second-class citizen status that Jews have held in most Arab countries for more than a 1,000 years.  Many are concerned that the claim of a right of return is only a tool for the destruction of Israel and the removal of Jewish people from the area.

Yet, there also seems to be some recognition within Israel of the importance of the right of return to the Palestinians, as well as some room for manoeuvre.  Israel has in the past offered for a small number of Palestinians the right to return, and in the Palestine Papers leaked by Al-Jazeera that the Palestinian leadership accepted that how many people would return could be decided through negotiation.  This would mean some token number of Palestinians being granted the right to live in Israel and gain Israeli citizenship; the number would need to be significant enough to show that Israel recognises the importance of the issue but small enough that it would not threaten Israel’s current way of existence.  But if both sides recognise this, then why has there not been any movement for such a deal?

A solution would mean that there were no more Palestinian ‘refugees’, as any final agreement would include the giving up of all future claims to Israeli land.  The benefits of a full solution to Israel and through the development of a long-awaited Palestinian state are obvious, and arguably most mainstream politicians believe this will be the eventual solution. Yet there are many countries that would not condone such a solution; specifically, the countries which border the Palestinian territories or host refugees.  Because for each of them, the question would be arise of what is the difference between the Arabs in Israel (ethnic Palestinians), those who would be in Palestine, and those who would be in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt?  None whatsoever, except the Palestinians in the former would be citizens with rights; those in the latter will have none.  Whichever Palestinians do not get the right to return to what is Israeli land will almost certainly have the right to go to the new state of Palestine; but what if they don’t want to leave their homes and move to a land which they have never before seen?

This could lead to a situation where Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt either have to forcibly remove the remaining Palestinians from their countries or give them full citizenship.  Neither of these options are ones that the Arab countries are willing to take.  The first option is a non-starter, since it would make these countries appear unconcerned about the plight of their Arab brethren.  But if they are so concerned, why not take in the Palestinians as citizens? The answer truly lies within these countries’ internal politics.  First, we must consider the governments in these countries: the best are semi-democratic, the worst, completely autocratic.  As a result, control over these governments always lies in a delicate balance, which has only been further perturbed by the continuing spread of the Arab Spring.  Adding any number of poor discontents to their population could just be another yard of rope for these governments to hang themselves with.  This could be especially true if the Palestinians decide that these governments hold some responsibility for only offering citizenship after more than 60 years of keeping them as refugees, when this could have been offered all along.

Furthermore, some of their anti-Israel bias would lose its force, which has been a powerful political tool for many Arab autocrats to distract from internal issues.  It is easy to use Israel as a scapegoat when they can use propaganda images from the refugee camps (ignoring the fact that these camps are located in and perpetuated by their own countries, causing suffering that never would have occurred if they acted towards the Palestinians as Israel has toward Jewish refugees by taking them in from the Middle East, North Africa and throughout the world.)  As we have seen recently from the actions of Assad’s regime in Syria on Naksa Day and of multiple statements made by Ahmedinejad in Iran and other powerful players in the region, this tool is the staple diet of Middle Eastern autocratic control. To end this status quo by gaining peace might be one more step towards losing power and control.

There are countless examples to show that many Arab countries fear a solution for the Palestinian refugee issue and are willing to apply their huge political pressure to keep this from happening.  Jordan has even voiced willingness to break with the Arab bloc and vote against the Palestinian Authority’s statehood bid at the UN. As Jordan hosts nearly 2 million Palestinian refugees, and was the controlling power of the West Bank up until 1967, the question of where Jordanian ethnicity ends and where Palestinian ethnicity begins is one that they do not want to address.

Reports from Lebanon say similar things, with Lebanese refugee doctor declaring that “it is abundantly clear that Lebanon cannot, or is not willing to, absorb any more [Palestinians],” (italics mine).  Often under proxy control of Syria or Iran, and strongly developing the capabilities of groups such as Hezbollah, the Lebanese government would worry about he influence that these additional Palestinians would have on their government.  This is beyond the huge amount of money and support that many Arab nations give to promoting terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas; groups which seek to perpetuate a violent end for Israel rather than looking for a long-term peaceful solution.  Even Egypt, under its uncertain future, does not look likely to promote peace, with one prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood recently declaring that the proper home for all Palestinians is Israel.

Who can stop this cycle?

The simple answer would be the Palestinian leadership.  They could easily choose to return to the negotiation table with concrete offers that were previously alluded to privately–ones that, if were public, the international community would put much pressure on both sides to accept.  This would allow peace negotiations to continue, despite Arab pressure to the contrary.  While the Palestinian Authority has refused to negotiate until the building of settlements is frozen, this is only truly an excuse, as they refused to negotiate before the freeze expired.  Yet, they continue to be ineffectual.  The PA knows they have a politically tenuous situation of their own making, because they have never pushed their people to accept peace, or make the difficult choices that must happen for peace.  So when the time comes, the leaders continue to find ways not to make an unpopular decision, rather than making its people ready for the future.

All that the Palestinian leadership seems concerned with is trying to be as powerful as possible by playing the system, regardless of the impact on its people.  Currently, the PA plays a careful balancing act that allows it to be propped up by all sides.  Continuing to act as if they are pursuing an answer to the problem is a good way to continue to get massive US and EU foreign aid.  Continuing to play the poor child being bullied by big, bad Israel is a good way to continue to keep its Arab neighbours on its side and to build up some useful propaganda.  The only ones it doesn’t help are the Palestinian refugees, who may unfortunately have to look forward to keeping that status for a long-time in the future.

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July 11, 2011

The Creation of South Sudan and Palestinian Independence

Last weekend, many countries around the world welcomed the birth of a new nation: South Sudan.  This at one point may have seemed impossible; after many years of fighting and considering the many seemingly intractable problems of resolving a long-running conflict based on ethnicity, control and oil money, independence was never a given. Yet, with great help from outside bodies, a negotiated settlement was achieved between the current government of Sudan and the opposition which formed the basis of the new government for South Sudan.

The creation of South Sudan brings with it an easy parallel to another hopeful state-in-the-making, a future state of Palestine. To understand why many Sudanese people are celebrating and yet the Palestinians are waiting, the differences in their approaches to statehood must be understood.  It is worth exploring not only at the Palestinian Authority’s most recent plan to approach the United Nations for a unilateral declaration of statehood, but also to consider the Arab Peace Initiative (officially proposed by the Arab League in 2002), which is still technically on the table.

The Palestinian Authority’s plan to pursue a unilateral declaration of statehood at the United Nations, most likely in September, has more holes in it than a chain-link fence. First, it does not fundamentally resolve many of the biggest obstacles for peace, such as status of ‘refugees’ and East Jerusalem. Next, the United States has followed Obama’s recent call for a negotiated resolution to the development of Palestinian statehood, and in doing so has said that it will veto the resolution in the UN Security Council.  Even if a majority of states vote for it when it comes to the UN General Assembly, it will still remain only a minor upgrade in status–and a non-binding one at that.  It certainly could succeed in putting a bit more international pressure on Israel when it comes to its actions around its borders.  Yet it might not. The United Nations’ repeated refusal to denounce terror while simultaneously condemning Israel has bred much contempt and mistrust from the latter, and it seems just as likely that Netanyahu’s government will just ignore it.  What it will definitely achieve is the entrenchment of the Israeli belief that the Palestinian Authority in unwilling to take its security concerns seriously, which could push back the basis of negotiations even further.

There is also a huge danger for the Palestinian Authority that a unilateral declaration it could backfire spectacularly if the United States carries through with its threat to cut funding for the Palestinian Authority.  Members of the US Senate have suggested that if Palestine it is truly ready for statehood, it obviously does not need the incredible amount of foreign aid it receives; do not be surprised if other members of the Middle East Quartet, also displeased with the PA’s blatant disregard for their advice to return to a negotiated settlement, choose to follow suit. And this is all if they can get there; ongoing Fatah-Hamas rivalry has led to an impasse in the formation of a Palestinian unity government.

Perhaps, rather than this unilateral approach, there could be more success in a pan-Arab agreement.  The Arab Peace Initiative, created and delivered by 10 of the 22 members of the Arab League in 2002, offers a positive basis for the a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Whatever the reasons for its creation (certainly some of the motivation behind the initiative’s development was to deflect criticism of Saudi Arabia when, less than one year after 9/11, it was beginning to emerge that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi), this offer of recognition is the most that has ever been offered by the Arab States.  The proposal would exchange recognition in return for a complete withdrawal to the 1967 lines, including the disputed border areas of Lebanon and the Golan Heights, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The Arab Peace Initiative is certainly an intriguing step towards a full solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.  Yet it does still face some problems.  Recognition is given as a matter of fact, but, while there is mention of security, there is no plan for enforcing it, such as an international security force. In an area of great upheaval and such a long history of conflict, it would be hard to see who would be willing to accept security on goodwill–especially as their is no guarantee that the governments involved today will be the same in the future.  Furthermore, the Initiative gives the Palestinians some of their demands (such as the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem), ignores entirely the issue of land swaps (which almost every other interested party believes to be necessary), and leaves the complex ‘refugee’ issue as one to be resolved in the future.  If it were to agree to the plan, Israel will gain recognition from many countries, but be left with troubling security concerns, and either have negative solutions or no solutions at all to the most intractable problems.  It is almost inconceivable that an Israeli government could agree to a move that would antagonise the Israeli rights without gaining a massive concession, such as a guaranteed maximum number on ‘refugees.’   Yet the meeting of the Arab League in Riyadh in 2007 reaffirmed its position and refused to alter any of the document’s text, in essence leaving the Arab Peace Initiative on permanent hold.

What do both of these plans have in common?  They were drawn up without input of many important parties.  Neither of the plans had Israeli consultation. Furthermore, the plans either ignore the concerns of the surrounding Arab countries or their Palestinian inhabitants have been ignored, and without dealing with the Palestinian ‘refugees’ in other countries,  there is no guarantee about the stopping of Hezbollah activities in Syria and Lebanon; an essential failure in the security of any peace arrangements.  Declarations without negotiations are almost essentially doomed to failure, as it is hard to believe that they will address seriously the concerns of all parties.  This being the case, it is hard to see them as much more than a political tool for putting pressure on their opponents.

Yet South Sudan’s independence can teach us a lot about how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has shown that not only are negotiated settlements to conflicts possible, but also that they are successful.   Both Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority have shown a willingness to negotiate in the past.  It may take some incentives and pressure from outside governments, but for any successful solution, both of these players must be at the table.  Only a negotiated settlement makes it possible for the leaders of each governmental body to recognise the other country from a position of power, and mutual recognition is a cornerstone of any successful solution. Israel should be the first country to recognise a new Palestinian state, the way that Sudan was the first country to recognise South Sudan.  If other Arab nations were willing to get involved in the discussions, it could help to make sure that there is less opposition to any final plan.

If a solution through negotiations seems all too easy, this is perhaps because it is.  The fact is that, despite the well-earned celebrations over South Sudan, there are core issues among the Sudanese that still need to be resolved.  One of the key areas of worry is the region of Darfur, an area about the size of France, that is still under the control and threat of Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan.  For many years they have worked to ethnically cleanse Darfur with acts of genocide.  Until serious reform and negotiation come to Darfur, this area is still a long way from achieving any sort of peace and security.

This leads directly to a problem which seems to be unable to be resolved around the negotiating table: the problem of Hamas in Gaza. While the actual situations are very different between Darfur and Gaza, the obstacle remains the same: the political leaders being unwilling to negotiate. Gaza was given its independence (though not full statehood) through the Israeli withdrawal in 2005.  Yet its leaders, Hamas, not only refuse to recognise Israel, but also states in its charter its commitment to Israel’s destruction.  In doing so it has steadfastly refused to negotiate or to work towards a lasting peace.  Instead, Hamas has itself perpetrated and allowed other terrorist groups to launch thousands of rockets into southern Israel.  Instead of supporting the Arab Peace Initiative, Hamas choose to mark its introduction with the Passover Massacre, the worst suicide bombing of the 2nd Intifada, killing 30 Israeli civilians and injuring over 100 more.  It has recently also shown this by considering giving up their political wing, as they believe the reality of the compromise required in government has been too distracting from their fundamental goal of the destruction of Israel.

But perhaps it also means that Gaza can put to the side for now, as was the case with Darfur for South Sudan. Of course, it is an area of great concern that must be dealt with as soon as possible.  Yet the pathway is clear, as soon as Hamas, or whoever replaces them in power in Gaza is ready to take it: give up arms and open a dialogue for peace; not only will you get it, but also you will have the literal door opened on the economic blockade, leading to further prosperity. But the best way to convince Gaza to do so is by first establishing a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian Authority for a creation of a state in the West Bank; when its residents are celebrating like the South Sudanese, surely the people of Gaza will see what they’ve been missing.

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June 25, 2011

Palestinian Politics and the Power of Image

It is amazing what the situation of one person can teach us about the workings of a culture and an ongoing political obstacle to the peace process. That person is Gilad Shalit and the obstacle is the power of image in the Arab world.

Sadly, many Americans and Europeans will have never heard of the story of Gilad Shalit.  He is an IDF soldier and today is the fifth anniversary of his kidnapping.  Five years ago today, a group of Hamas militants made a cross-border raid into Israel and captured Shalit.  So far there has been no success in any of the efforts made to secure his release. Yet the story of these failed negotiations for his freedom may tell us more about Palestinian politics than many years of stalemate in the peace process.

First, we must understand the conditions that explain why Gilad Shalit is still being held as a hostage.  The bargaining process has been one that can only be understood through an Israeli perspective.  A country born in the wake of sinister forces bent on the destruction of the Jewish people, Israel has made a commitment to always take care of its people, as its people do to Israel through their required military service.  The feeling in Israel is that the government must do everything in its power to secure Shalit’s release–and is willing to make sacrifices that do so that would surprise most people from outside of the region.

America’s long-running policy of not negotiating with terrorists is practical; it attempts to discourage would-be kidnappers by depriving them of any reward. The world would be shocked to hear that the USA was willing to release even one or two terrorist suspects in return for a kidnapped soldier. Similarly, it would also be surprising to hear many European countries willing to make such an offer, as it could put its citizens at risk.  Yet Israel, with her commitment to her people, just offered Hamas a deal that many other countries would find beyond belief; they agreed release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners to secure the freedom of Gilad Shalit.

Yet, perhaps the most shocking point for those outside of the situation is that Hamas rejected the offer outright.  Hamas must know they will never get a better one. So how do we explain this decision? There are many possible reasons behind it; it could be because Shalit is dead, it could be because Hamas does not actually care about its own people, and it could be about the power of image in the Arab world and its affect on Palestinian politics.  While all three may have their influence, it is surely the power of image, is the most important.

We must begun with the very real possibility that Gilad Shalit is dead.  5 years is a long time to be held hostage by a designated terrorist organisation; especially one committed to the destruction of Shalit’s country and her people.  The recent refusal of Hamas to even allow the Red Cross to visit the hostage and check on his condition is enough to make anyone fear the worst.  But even if the worst is true and Gilad Shalit is dead, it does not mean that the negotiations would be finished.  Israel would still be willing to do a prisoner exchange for the return of his body; while the deal would not be anywhere near the 1,000 mark, at least Hamas would win the return of some of its people by pursuing a deal.

Then there is the argument that Hamas does not care about its people.  All evidence shows that this is at least partially true.   That Hamas would not agree to such a large-scale prisoner exchange shows that they are more than willing to leave their people stuck in Israeli jails.  This decision also corroborates with the fact that Hamas’ military wing routinely dresses in civilian clothing and has often been willing to use its own people as human shields (both of which are against the rules of war and can lead to significantly higher civilian casualties of Palestinians). But let us not forget Hamas’ cause, stated in their charter, which is the destruction of the state of Israel and its replacement with a Palestinian state. Hamas may believe that its actions are truly the best for the Palestinian people as it believes achieving its stated goals is the best possible outcome of the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict.  Hamas is making a utilitarian calculation that the release of 1,000 Palestinians will not be as helpful to their cause as continuing to hold Shalit hostage. But what could possibly be more useful or more important than 1,000 new recruits, returning to the Gaza Strip where they will feel indebted to Hamas for securing their release?

Image is the answer. Being able to make a show of strength against Israel is all that currently matters to Hamas.  In fact, it may be that this image is all that is holding Hamas in power, as their government has recently shown an inability to control many of the insurgents throughout the Gaza Strip. Many in the area will also hold their government responsible for their economic troubles, for its continued military attacks against Israel have brought many businesses to a halt. The economy struggles under the dual weight of the Israeli blockade and Hamas’ refusal to use the incredible amount of foreign aid it receives for the purpose of developing infrastructure in Gaza.  Hamas’ hold on power may be tenuous at best, and it relies on the strength shown through this small victory over Israel. The need of a certain image to retain authority is nothing new to the world of politics, but it is even more important in the Arab world, where there is little history of democratic traditions to ensure the the stable transition of power.

Hence, image means everything when it comes to power in the Middle East.  The Arab Spring has only helped to expose this idea (despite bringing with it the hope that there might finally be a significant change to reign of so many autocracies.)   The power of image is the one that that has caused autocrats to fall as soon as they make real concessions.  When Mubarak finally gave in to reforms, his reign was effectively over; having to make concessions showed that he no longer had authority over the country. Bashar al-Assad’s most recent speech in Syria was meant to calm the protests; yet his mention of reforms only led to a surge in the uprising.  Without the air of authority, Arab governments lose legitimacy.

The concern with image is not limited to Hamas’ dealings with Israel; it is bubbling under the surface throughout all of Palestinian politics.  This is why the recently announced Palestinian unity government is doomed to failure.  Neither Hamas nor Fatah were willing to make the concessions of power to the other side that is necessary for a unity government–to cede that position of power would be greatly damaging to their image.  This damage could then greatly impact the authority of whichever group was not elected as the head of the government, and could continue to hurt them politically in the future.  So image has helped to prevent the realisation of one of the longest-held dreams by many Palestinians: the creation of a unified state.

Image has also left the Palestinian Authority in a conundrum stated commitment to seek unilateral recognition for statehood from the United Nations in September, based on the 1967 borders.  While this initially seemed like a good posture for the Palestinian Authority to court worldwide political support (or to force concessions from Israel), the fact that any such resolution will be vetoed by the United States in the Security Council means that it will have practically no effect on the ground.  All it will do is entrench both sides further away from peace, and possibly lead to Israel considering the annexation of parts of the West Bank.  With the political repercussions of this move staring him in the face,  the PA’s President, Mahmoud Abbas, seems to be looking for a way out.  But unless he finds a way out without losing face, his party, Fatah, may suffer a loss of authority in the West Bank.  The only realistic solution seems to be if Abbas could get Israeli to make major concessions.  This rescue plan seems rather unlikely, for the last time that Israel made unilateral concessions (through a moratorium on cessation of settlement building in East Jerusalem), Abbas still refused to being the PA to the negotiating table. It is unlikely that the hardline Israeli government under Netanyahu, which subsequently refused to extend the settlement freeze, will make such concessions anytime soon.

Yet this is nothing new in the world of Palestinian politics, where the obsession with image greatly contributed to the sad collapse of the seemingly hopeful peace process in the Clinton years.  Despite being offered a deal which agreed to 99% of Palestinian demands (once again, probably a better deal than the Palestinians can possibly hope to see again), the former head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, inexplicably turned it down. Yet the underlying reason, it could be argued, is the same as the most recent Palestinian political stumbles. Since Arafat a that time had become the face of the Palestinian cause, any solution to the conflict would lead to a new state with an elected government with the cause of development; this would inevitably lead to Arafat’s loss of his singular status.  Unwilling to sacrifice his own image, Arafat reneged at the last possible minute on the agreement.  Image sadly triumphed at the expense of the peace and prosperity of millions of people in the Middle East, both Palestinians and Israelis.

The power of image in an incredibly important feature of Palestinian politics, but is has also contributed to the massive failure in leadership for the Palestinian people throughout the past 20 years.  Palestine needs leaders who are willing to sacrifice some of their ideals or status to make concessions for peace, rather than sacrifice their own people.  If those leaders do not emerge, more radical alternatives may need to be considered, like the exclusion of these leaders from the peace process until they are serious about their commitment to it. I wait for the day that there are strong Palestinian leaders who have the courage to renounce violence and obtain the release of Gilad Shalit, but I am afraid that I might be waiting for a long time. For history has shown us that when the chips are down, the only thing you can count on a Palestinian leader to do is to look in the mirror.

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